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State Dept. review completed

LEGISLATIVE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP MEETING

Wednesday, June 9, 1971

Time and Place: 2:05 p.m. - 3:10 p.m., White House Situation RoomParticipants:

Chairman - Gen. Alexander M. Haig

NSC - John Lehman

State - David Abshire
Colgate PrenticeWilliam Hyland
Richard Smyser
Morris Edmundson

Defense - Rady Johnson

White House - John Russell Deane
John Scali
William E. Timmons
Richard Cook
Ken BelieuON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLYSUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The following tasks were assigned:

OSD Review Completed

McGovern-Hatfield

- 1) updates of rationale and talking points papers prepared last year by State, Defense and Justice, (coordinated by State)
- 2) draft speeches, (State)
- 3) target list of Senators to be approached and by whom (White House)
- 4) press stories stressing the implications of the bill (Scali)
- 5) a draft of a substitute House resolution stressing mutual withdrawal (and possibly a softening amendment) for use by a senior Democrat (Smyser/Cook)
- 6) memorandum to Dr. Kissinger making the case for a substitute resolution in the House (Lehman)

SECRET

1a

RFE

- 1) prepare a paper documenting the effectiveness of RFE and RL (CIA)
- 2) arrange for statements of support for the radios from prominent figures outside the government (White House)
- 3) marshal support from the Jewish community (White House)
- 4) consider a possible fall-back position of having USIA assume responsibility for the radios (State/ Defense)

Symington Amendment

- 1) consider whether we can make public any additional information on the war in Laos beyond the authorized statement made by State Department spokesman Charles Bray (State/Defense)
- 2) update the classified talking points and get to a group of key Senators as much classified information as they need to make a good case (State/ Defense)
- 3) prepare speeches (State)
- 4) prepare a target list of Senators to be approached and by whom (State)
- 5) stimulate press stories on the potential threat to Vietnamization and a possible confrontation with Thailand resulting in the invoking of SEATO (White House)

SECRET

2

Draft Bill

Gen. Haig: Since the State Department people aren't here yet, let's start with the draft extension bill.

Mr. Belieu: There are all sorts of schemes. Taft has an amendment now which would call for no more than 100,000 draftees in 1971 and no more than 60,000 in 1972. Also, I hear rumors that the Democrats are going to try to hold to a one-year draft limitation.

Gen. Haig: That's the trouble when you start to compromise. When we went to 150,000 they thought we were softening and started trying to beat us down to 100,000. (to Johnson) What about this?

Mr. Johnson: Any cut is bad, of course, but we think we can adjust this.

Mr. Lehman: What about an escape clause for the President?

Mr. Johnson: Kennedy argues that he wouldn't need an escape clause except in the event of a major war, and that would change the whole picture anyway.

McGovern-Hatfield

Mr. Belieu: More importantly, McGovern-Hatfield is coming up for a vote on Wednesday and we should start to work on that immediately. This would provide no funds after December 31, 1971 for military operations in Indochina. There's some effort to change that date to June 30, 1972.

Gen. Haig: We should go into high gear on this. Can we talk about a specific program?

Mr. Belieu: We need a White Paper, including some rationale, and some speeches. We also need a target list. (Reading from a list of Senators voting for the bill last year, indicating which agency should approach each Senator) I will send this list around. As we did on NATO, let's all call in and keep together on this.

Gen. Haig: (to Lehman) Let's get a list of who is doing what. (to Scali) Can we get some press support to break at the right time -- some stories on the implications of McGovern-Hatfield?

Mr. Belieu: This won't be an easy one. We start with 52 anti-war Senators.

Mr. Scali: Do you have a reading on votes?

SECRET

3

Mr. Timmons: We think 60-40.

Mr. Smyser: Would it do us any good to use the Xuan Thuy interview?

Gen. Haig: We need a good rationale, and talking points.

Mr. Scali: Secretary Laird is on Face the Nation Sunday.

Mr. Lehman: State, Defense and Justice did good papers last year. Let's get an update of those.

Gen. Haig: We have a Leadership meeting Tuesday.

Mr. Belieu: Followed by a Republican Policy Committee meeting.

Mr. Smyser: Let's have each agency update its own papers. I'm concerned that we don't miss anything. We don't follow all the details that closely here.

Gen. Haig: (to Smyser) Call Bill Sullivan and ask him for the update.

Mr. Smyser: Whom should I talk to at Defense and Justice?

Gen. Haig: Let Sullivan coordinate with Defense and Justice.

Mr. Smyser: Okay. I'll ask for it by c.o.b. tomorrow.

Gen. Haig: They should include the whole range -- Xuan Thuy, Clark Clifford, etc. This would be for internal White House use and for press guidance. Then we can consider who might help in the press, editorially or otherwise. Meanwhile, we can be working on the target list -- where this kind of information would help.

Mr. Abshire: Mary Lord's group has put out some good pamphlets on this.

Mr. Lehman: I'll talk to our contact in that group.

Gen. Haig: If anyone has any additional ideas for breakfasts, meetings, etc. they should let us know. (to Cook) What is the situation in the House?

Mr. Cook: They have their rule, and the vote could come Wednesday or Thursday on the Whalen amendment. Findley will offer a substitute for the December 31 end-the-war date which is more or less Cooper-Church all over

SECRET

SECRET

4

again (reading text). I assume we don't like that.

Gen. Haig: Hell, no!

Mr. Cook: There could also be any number of others. There is something to be said for our putting together some substitute language, stressing the issue of mutual withdrawal. If we could get this to a senior Democrat and get him to put it forward, this would give us some control in conference.

Gen. Haig: What is the timing?

Mr. Cook: Wednesday.

Gen. Haig: My instinct tells me that this would be opposed upstairs.

Mr. Cook: Why?

Gen. Haig: Lehman has a draft of a concurrent resolution.

Mr. Cook: That won't do. That would only take care of the McClory Resolution.

Gen. Haig: (to Smyser) Why don't you work up some language with Dick Cook, but I don't think we should put too much steam behind this. We will have to make a case and sell it upstairs on the grounds that it would give us some control.

Mr. Cook: If we don't do this, we will get the Findley version or possibly something worse. If the right Democrat could get a fairly good vote on our language, it would remove some of the poison from the issue and give us some measure of control.

Mr. Lehman: Could we protect it from amendments?

Mr. Cook: That's iffy. We could possibly arm one of our own people with an amendment.

Mr. Prentice: I talked to Teague today and he has agreed to help.

Mr. Cook: I can't guarantee we can keep control, but at least we would have more control this way.

SECRET

SECRET

5

Gen. Haig: I'm sold, if the experts agree.

Mr. Abshire: It's a good tactic.

Mr. Smyser: What if we lose?

Mr. Abshire: We may lose to Findley or someone else anyhow.

Mr. Cook: It's possible we could have some confusion on the floor, but I think we can get enough advance signals to the leadership on both sides to avoid that.

Gen. Haig: So we need a short resolution and a possible amendment that would soften it a little if necessary but that would still be supported.

Mr. Cook: It will be a little tough, but we can get signals to the leaders that we want to defeat all amendments to the substitute language and get a clean vote on it.

Gen. Haig: (to Lehman) You do a memo to Henry (Kissinger) on why we should support this.

Mr. Abshire: We would, of course, do it only with the consent of the leadership.

Mr. Cook: Could we have the language by tomorrow?

Mr. Abshire: I'll have something over first thing in the morning.

Gen. Haig: We'll have the memo to Henry by noon tomorrow.

Mr. Lehman: What about the McClory Resolution?

Gen. Haig: That's not acceptable.

Mr. Cook: I'm being asked about that. I could use some rationale as to why we won't buy it.

Mr. Lehman: I'll give it to you.

RFE

Gen. Haig: Where do we stand on RFE?

SECRET

SECRET

6

Mr. Abshire: It came up in the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday. There was no quorum and when we tried to round up some of the members, the Committee staff accused us of pressuring the members. Fulbright moved to get a study by the Legislative Reference Section of the Library of Congress on the effectiveness of the Radios. I talked to McGee later, who said Fulbright wouldn't be able to stall indefinitely and they thought they could get it moving again quickly. I'm not so sure. Case is not a pusher, and Aiken is away. Fulbright will be in Europe for three weeks and Sparkman will be Acting Chairman. We hope we can get it moving in that time. In the House, it's still hung up between the two Chairmen -- Morgan and McMillan. If McMillan will agree to relinquish jurisdiction (as you know it got to the District Committee on a fluke) Morgan will move quickly on it. I think we should wait another week before we ask the President to see anyone on it.

Mr. Lehman: George Schultz sent a letter to Ellender today asking for a continuing resolution for three months for interim funding. Ellender wants to see the Radios die.

Mr. Abshire: He told us he wasn't in favor of them, but wouldn't stand in the way. There's no great opposition on the Foreign Relations Committee-- it's a matter of getting around Fulbright.

Mr. Maury: When is Fulbright due back? Could it be done in his absence?

Mr. Abshire: Hopefully. I've talked with Sparkman. If the study can be done quickly we could get Javits to bring it up. The Jewish community could be very helpful. We should ask Len Garment to speak to Rabbi Bernstein and others. The problem is how to get the study done quickly. It shows how effective Fulbright can be when he works up Ellender and others.

Mr. Lehman: If we do get the three-month continuing resolution, would that give us a little breathing time? Ellender said he wouldn't grant the extension.

Mr. Abshire: Why wouldn't we get it automatically with the Defense bill?

Mr. Lehman: There's some problem with that. Ellender indicated that he would refuse to include it in the 1972 bill and that June 30 is it. He said he would assist in getting the \$30 million for termination costs.

Gen. Haig: Let's find out who is doing the study and where he will get his material.

SECRET

SECRET

7

Mr. Maury: It will be very hard to document a meaningful study with overt material. We could document a very good case, but our material would be suspect. The question is how we can get in the act. A definitive statement can't be done using only overt material and, if it were done with our material, Fulbright wouldn't accept it.

Mr. Abshire: We'll get some information together. It would be better for it to come from State than CIA.

Mr. Maury: We'll do the same and pass it to you.

Mr. Hyland: We should be under no illusion that the study will be anything other than unfavorable. There's not much on the record, and what there is will likely be critical.

Gen. Haig: We need a paper for someone to use documenting the effectiveness of RFE.

Mr. Maury: We'll give something to Abshire.

Mr. Hyland: It would be best if this came from someone outside the Government who could either testify or issue a statement.

Gen. Haig: That will be easy -- we'll ask General Clay to find someone.

Mr. Abshire: Someone like Brzezinski would carry a helluva lot of weight.

Mr. Maury: What about Frank Shakespeare?

Mr. Abshire: It would be more valuable to have an outsider.

Mr. Maury: Shakespeare could rebut the argument that RFE duplicates VOA.

Mr. Abshire: Fulbright is now making his campaign against setting up a new corporation. He said he would have supported the original Case bill, and wonders why it couldn't be done through USIA. We might consider this option as a fallback if other Senators begin to accept the argument that we are merely setting up another agency. We'll take another look at this possibility.

SECRET

SECRET

8

Gen. Haig: OK. The immediate question is how to keep it alive past June 30.

Mr. Lehman: It may take direct intervention with Ellender.

Gen. Haig: The letter from Shultz won't do it. We may have to get the President to do it. We need to get our tactics on this. Then we need to look at the bill and a possible fall-back. CIA should prepare a good case on the effectiveness of the Radios and give it to State.

Mr. Abshire: And we should get the Jewish community working on it.

Gen. Haig: We can help with Javits and Garment. When should we begin on that?

Mr. Abshire: Right now.

Gen. Haig: And we'll call Clay to get some public support from key figures.

Mr. Abshire: Clay and Gruenther shouldn't themselves go public on this.

Gen. Haig: I agree. We'll ask them to get others to do it.

Symington Amendment

Mr. Lehman: (to Maury) Where does Symington get his \$250 million figure.

Mr. Maury: I'm not sure.

Mr. Abshire: He says the Administration wants \$350 in the next year for economic and military assistance, including CIA, excluding operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Mr. Belieu: His amendment says the Government of the United States may not spend more than \$200 million.

Mr. Maury: If he's talking about tactical air support, we spend \$3-400 million a year for tacair.

Mr. Lehman: He wants to cost out each B-52 strike, get sortie costs, etc.

Gen. Haig: We can't have this.

SECRET

9

Mr. Scali: What are the prospects for approval of this?

Gen. Haig: I didn't think he had a lot of support.

Mr. Abshire: Griffin doesn't think so.

Gen. Haig: (to Abshire) Is State anxious to declassify this information? Marvin Kalb is saying that State wants to declassify.

Mr. Lehman: Symington is pushing to declassify it.

Gen. Haig: That hurts us. If Kalb is right and State wants to declassify, you had better tell us so and why.

Mr. Scali: Kalb says that State believes they have a good case on Laos and that declassification would help us rather than hurt us. Is that so?

Mr. Abshire: I don't know if it's so. I certainly think we have a good case on the war in Laos and we are inhibited from arguing that case because everything about it is secret.

Gen. Haig: But the whole situation is so complicated. I think we have gone as far as we can go.

Mr. Abshire: Bray's statement was very helpful.

Gen. Haig: I agree.

Mr. Abshire: I don't know about going beyond that.

Mr. Lehman: How can we fight this on the floor if Senators begin to quote reports from the newsman who covers the State Department.

Mr. Abshire: Kalb builds on stories sometimes.

Mr. Scali: Kalb has been on the Hill a lot and he has some impact.

Gen. Haig: We need a damage-limiting strategy on this. We might be able to build on the Bray statement but I don't think we can add to it. There's a limit to what we can do. Let's ask State and Defense to take a look at it.

Mr. Scali: You might consider having Bray make a second statement saying the same thing.

SECRET

10

Gen. Haig: The real problem is to get a rationale to use with our friends to kill the substance of the thing.

Mr. Abshire: We had some good talking points before. We'll retune these. They're all classified, of course.

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Mr. Scali: Good; let's get them around.

Mr. Scali: It would jeopardize Vietnamization and the whole schmeer.

Mr. Abshire: We will have to use the classified talking points but we will need speeches to be used publicly to give the rationale. This is the most successful example of the Nixon Doctrine. If we can get enough figures together we can get some good speeches. We'll get something up the next day or two.

Gen. Haig: What is the timing?

Mr. Belieu: The procurement authorization bill is just waiting for the vote on the draft bill. It will probably be July or possibly August. We need a core of good people who will stand up and be counted.

Gen. Haig: Dave (Abshire) will get a target list of whom we should approach for speeches and for silent support. Let's have that by the first of next week. Defense and CIA should do the same and coordinate with State who will have to carry the ball on this.

Mr. Scali: If Dave (Abshire) can get me some information, I'll get some warning stories out on what will happen in Laos and in Vietnam. Get me the classified information quickly and I'll see what we can do with it. The columnists need two or three days lead time.

Mr. Abshire: I'll get you what we have immediately and get some additional material to you later.

Mr. Maury: Who will coordinate for State?

Mr. Abshire: Marshall Green.

SECRET

11

Mr. Scali: I saw Laird over the weekend and he thinks Symington will win.

Gen. Haig: We don't want to overreact on this and create an issue that isn't there.

Mr. Johnson: I don't know how many Senators felt they received any education from that secret session.

Mr. Belieu: There weren't many Senators there and the ones who were there were bored. They didn't think there was much that was new. We still need to marshal a hard core of people that will fight. But we need to give them more classified information. They can't fight without it, since the other side has it. We should use people who are not involved in the draft bill for this. Buckley wants to be helpful; let's brief him.

Mr. Lehman: (to Maury) How many have you briefed on Laos.

Mr. Scali: How many recently?

Mr. Maury: The Foreign Relations Committees and the CIA subcommittees of Armed Services and Appropriations.

Mr. Belieu: We need someone like Goldwater to tell them: "if you take away our support, the VC will march across Laos, and you'll find yourself with the Thais invoking SEATO. I can't say this publicly now, but if it happens, I'll go public and say you were responsible for it."

Mr. Abshire: We need to get a few competent Senators and give them everything they need to know to make a good case.

Mr. Cook: What about the existing structure of the CIA subcommittees?

Mr. Maury: Symington and Ellender are the only problems.

Mr. Abshire: It must be defended by people not on the CIA subcommittees. There's a good bit of resentment already, on the part of those who aren't in the know, of those who are.

SECRET

SECRET

12

Gen. Haig: Let's give Dave (Abshire) your recommendations for a list by Monday.

Mr. Lehman: Were we able to do anything about declassifying the figures on the B-52 strikes?

Mr. Johnson: The figures are available but are not yet released.

Mr. Scali: Is it a good case? Should we crank up Laird?

Mr. Johnson: I think Ken's (Belieu) approach is best.

Mr. Scali: Don't forget you have a good opportunity Sunday if you want to use Laird.

SECRET